Abstract
Introduction
Economic growth and unemployment are not always inversely related (Pissarides and Vallanti 2004, 2007) because an ambiguous relationship has also been found both across countries and across long periods of time in the same country (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Bean and Pissarides, 1993; Caballero, 1993; Hoon and Phelps, 1997; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001 ).
Theoretical explanations have usually focused on technological progress in order to determine the conditions that make productivity growth employment-friendly or employmentdisplacing.
1 This paper takes a different approach by exploring the role of the underground economy in shaping the productivity of firms, so that growth and unemployment can be affected in different ways. Indeed, unemployment may be absorbed by underground firms, which adopt backward technology (see, e.g., La Porta and Shleifer, 2008) , at the cost of reduced economic growth. In this case, the relationship between growth and unemployment emerges as positive, and the relationships between underground employment and unemployment emerges as negative. But both signs are reversed in a different case, i.e. when unemployment and the underground economy diminish because productivity grows by employing workers who prefer to become skilled, and thus not to work in underground firms.
2 Studying the ambiguous relationship between economic growth and unemployment by focusing on the underground economy is especially interesting for policy purposes. In fact, new policies can be envisaged to increase economic growth and to reduce unemployment.
Moreover, combating the underground economy, which is undesirable for fiscal and moral reasons, may avoid the counter-indication that unemployment could increase.
This paper studies these issues by adopting a matching-type of model, which has been used in the literature to study both the relationship between growth and unemployment (Laing et al., 1995; Howitt, 1994, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides, 1990 Pissarides, , 2000 Mortensen, 2005) , and the relationship between the underground employment and unemployment (Bouev, 2002 (Bouev, , 2005 Larsen, 2003, 2010; Fugazza and Jacques, 1 If the technological progress is disembodied, i.e. both old and new jobs benefit from higher labour productivity, the "capitalisation" effect yields a lower unemployment in the steady-state (Pissarides, 1990) ; whereas, if the technological progress is embodied, i.e. only the new jobs benefit from higher labour productivity, the "creative destruction" effect yields an increase in steady-state unemployment Howitt, 1994, 1998) . 2 A variety of evidence shows that regular firms employ skilled labour, while underground firms employ unskilled labour (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009; Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006; Kolm and Larsen, 2010) , and that employment in the underground sector and the education level within countries appear to be negatively correlated (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello and Zizza, 2009). by introducing investments in education, so that the steady-growth solutions can be identified, hence contributing to a better understanding of the relationship between growth and unemployment (issue (iii)). This section also provides some evidence on the role of monitoring the regularity of firms in the relationship between growth and unemployment by considering a broad cross-section of countries. Section 4 concludes the paper with some remarks on policy implications, while the appendices set out the relevant proofs and mathematical details.
The model with underground sector and unemployment
This section will show how the differentiation of the economy in two sectors, i.e. the regular and the underground sector, emerges essentially because the population of the economy has different levels of ability, and exploits the different production opportunities that are available. The presentation of the model starts with the matching equations that describe both how firms emerge from matching the vacancies with job seekers, and the possibility of the economy to differentiate in the two sectors.
The matching framework
The proposed model is of general equilibrium unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000) , where numerous firms produce the same type of good, but adopt different institutional set-ups and production techniques. They may be registered, and therefore pay a production tax and adopt a relatively advanced technique; or they may be nonregistered, and therefore evade taxes and adopt a less efficient technique. Hence nonregistered firms form the underground or shadow sector of the economy, which is illegal because of the process employed, not because of the goods being produced.
As is usual in matching-type models (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001 ), the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is regulated by an aggregate matching function where V i is the value of a vacancy; J i is the value of a filled job; U i is the value for seeking a job; W i is the value for being employed; c i is the cost to post a vacancy; x is entrepreneurial ability; y i is labour productivity, which depends -in the regular sector -on human capital of workers, h; w i is the wage rate; τ is an exogenous production tax; ρ is the monitoring rate, i.e. the exogenous instantaneous probability of a firm being discovered (and destroyed) as unregistered; δ is the exogenous destruction rate; z is the opportunity cost of employment.
The parameters r, ρ and δ are always considered as positive and given, while c i , y i , τ and z are positive and given but they will change endogenously in section 3. Similarly, h is assumed as temporarily given, since it will be determined in section 3, thus also affecting w i . The entrepreneurial ability x is heterogeneous among individuals, as discussed in the next subsection, so that the solutions of the equations will depend on x.
Precisely, the wage rate in both sectors is assumed to be the outcome of bargaining between one of the workers who seeks a job in the sector and the entrepreneur endowed with 
Therefore, the wage rate depends, in particular, on the labour productivity, which is homogeneous within each sector, i.e. i y , with
, but not on the heterogeneity of the entrepreneurial ability x. All entrepreneurs of each sector thus adopt the same wage rate, i.e. i w . This result, which may appear unusual, can be justified by the following grounds: first, the entrepreneurial ability may include the ability to bargain the wage, so that the greater is the entrepreneurial x with respect to the minimum min x , the greater is the ability to put an upward limit to wages, secondly, workers may be unable to distinguish entrepreneurs for their ability during wage bargaining, while it is common knowledge that labour productivity is homogeneous within each sector.
The surplus of a job in each sector is defined as the sum of the worker's and firm's value of being on the job, net of the respective outside options, so that
Using the Bellman equations, we get: Note that the heterogeneity of the surpluses is due to the overall heterogeneity of entrepreneurial ability x. The expected present values of vacancies for firms can be also 
As in Fonseca et al. (2001) , we ignore the range beyond which i Empirical evidence suggests that underground employment regards low productivity jobs (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009; Mattos and Ogura, 2009 (Rauch, 1991; Fugazza and Jacques, 2003; Kolm and Larsen, 2003; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006; Albrecht et al., 2009 ).
Moral cost, entrepreneurial ability and the underground sector
Following the idea that both economic incentives and social norms drive individual behaviour, we assume that participating to the shadow economy involves a moral cost, because the individual may feel a sense of guilt or remorse to deviate from the social norm (Traxler 2010; Kolm and Larsen 2002; Elster 1989 
yields a threshold (reservation) value R which separates the individuals whose moral cost is relatively low, thus inducing him to search for an irregular job, i.e. R R< , from the individuals who feel a high moral cost, and prefer to search for a job in the regular sector, i.e. R R≥ . As a consequence, more pervasive is the underground sector (i.e. the higher is s θ with respect to r θ ), more people search for a job in this sector (i.e. the higher is the threshold value R ), since the outside opportunity is higher.
A more important role in the model is played by the entrepreneurial ability of individuals x, because it determines whether they post a vacancy in one or the other sector. 
The individual must be endowed with a minimum level of entrepreneurial ability in order to open a vacancy, thus becoming an entrepreneur. As will shortly be made clear, this minimum level is required to enter the underground sector only, because the level of ability required to enter the regular sector is even higher. Thus, the minimum ability required to become an entrepreneur ( min x ) can be obtained from the zero-profit condition in the underground sector, because an individual with entrepreneurial ability x can always choose between posting a vacancy and searching for a job:
This result is due to the following: The distinction between individuals who post a vacancy in the underground sector and those who post a vacancy in the regular sector must take into account their entrepreneurial ability and their moral cost if they participate to the underground economy. It rather natural to assume that the higher is entrepreneurial ability, the higher is moral cost, because entrepreneurial ability can be better displayed if it does not violate social norms. In formulae:
( )
Therefore, since the level of entrepreneurial ability is lower in the underground sector, the moral cost becomes an increasing function of the size of the regular sector (Kolm and Larsen, 2002; Pugno and Lisi, 2011) .
Let us define a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability
such that two entrepreneurs drawn from the two sectors yield equal expected profitability, i.e.:
T can therefore be derived from equations y , which is a necessary condition for the regular sector to be able to survive, and it qualifies our Assumption 1. A further result can be obtained from these restrictions which characterises the entrepreneurs'
7 The cost to post a vacancy in the underground sector c s should be very low, since ease of entry is often one of the criteria used to define the informal sector (Gërxhani, 2004) . By contrast, the cost c r is often very heavy because of regulations, administrative burdens, licence fees and bribery (Bouev, 2005) .
choice: the intercept of ( )
is lower than the intercept of ( ) x V s , and the slope of ( )
steeper than the slope of ( ) Fig. 1 ).
========== Fig. 1 about here (now at the end) ==========
Note that another threshold for R emerges, i.e. ( ) T x R = , which separates the entrepreneurs of the two sectors. Since R is a positive function of x, this threshold is greater than the other threshold R , which separates individuals who search for a job (workers). More precisely, it must be true that:
From the macroeconomic point of view, the entrepreneurs' indifference condition [6] implies that, given the set of entrepreneurs l − 1 , the share of entrepreneurs who open a vacancy in the regular sector is:
while the share
opens a vacancy in the underground sector. Entrepreneurs may thus post a vacancy and then fill the job, or fail to fill it, in one of the two sectors, so that it can be simply stated that
Equation [7] can be re-written in a more general form as follows: x , strictly regards the underground sector.
Lemma 3. The less able entrepreneurs open irregular vacancies; the abler entrepreneurs open regular vacancies.
This result strengthens the previous section's conclusion about wages.
Unemployment and the steady state general equilibrium
Although the economy has two sectors, we empirically observe a single rate of unemployment, which is defined thus:
where r n and s n represent steady-state employment in the regular and underground sector, respectively. Since unemployed workers can search for a job only in one of the two sectors, we assume that the larger the size of the sector, the greater the number of job-seekers in that Since jobs arrive to unemployed workers at the rate ( )
, and regular and irregular filled jobs are destroyed at the rate δ and ( ) ρ δ + , respectively, then in the steady-state equilibrium it must be that: Equation [14] can be rewritten in general and explicit form as follows:
where steady-state unemployment u is a function of vacancies in the underground sector only. 
Discussion
The main result of the model of this section is that not only is there an interior solution whereby both the underground sector and the regular sector survive in equilibrium (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006; Albrecht et. al., 2009) , but this equilibrium is determined by allocating heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability between the two sectors (Rauch, 1991; Carillo and Pugno, 2004) . This may explain the so-called "shadow puzzle", i.e. the persistence of the underground sector despite advances in detection technologies and greater organisation by public authorities to reduce irregularities (issue (i) in the Introduction). This kind of explanation runs counter to the argument that the underground sector is an incubator of infant industries (see also La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Rauch, 1991; Levenson and Maloney, 1998) .
The second result is that the greater the relative size of the regular sector, the higher the wage gap between the regular and the underground sector. The gap is always positive for a sufficiently higher level of productivity in the regular sector.
A number of other important results can be drawn from comparative statics exercises, although described only in dynamic terms for conciseness. A general exercise concerns the effects of the shift of the T-curve due to changes in some parameters. Its downward shift decreases both the (partial) equilibrium of s v in Fig , and employment in the regular sector, r n , are greater because of the greater probability of finding a regular job.
The main policy implications can be drawn from the effects of the changes in the policy parameters on T, and hence on the proportion of the underground sector, i.e.:
In other words, closer monitoring, lower taxation and lower costs for posting official vacancies reduce the underground sector. This is in line with the conclusions of other models (see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; Bouev, 2005 
Proposition 2. If v s ≤ v r , the relationship between v s and u is negative if ρ is sufficiently low, it is positive if ρ is sufficiently high. If v s >v r the relationship between v s and u is positive for any ρ (see Appendix B for proof).
This is an interesting result from a policy implications point of view. In fact, the role of the monitoring parameter is strengthened, since any policy intended to reduce the irregular sector may also reduce the unemployment rate if ρ is sufficiently high. 
The model with investment in education and endogenous productivity growth
The relationship between economic growth and unemployment has been recently investigated by focusing the analysis on the role of technology. The present paper takes another look, although maintaining the long-run perspective, by recognising that in economies not at the technological frontier, the underground sector may play a major role because a substantial share of the economy produces with this different type of organisation. 9 Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) focus on the role of the job destruction rate. According to their matching model, policies that reduce the cost of formality (or those that increase the cost of informality) produce an increase in the share of formal employment while also reducing unemployment because the reallocation between formal and informal jobs has non-neutral effects on the unemployment rate, since informal jobs record much higher separation rates (namely, more inflows into unemployment). This section will show that economic growth and unemployment may be negatively or positively correlated, depending on the level of the monitoring rate on the regularity of firms, which both captures the country's rule of law and affects the size of the underground sector.
For this purpose, our matching model will be extended in order to study steady-state growth, and some cross-country evidence will provide empirical plausibility to backup the theoretical results. Possibilities of multiple equilibria of steady-growth will be further explored.
A steady-growth solution of the model
This paper assumes that human capital accumulation is the primary engine of economic growth. In the growth literature, workers' human capital usually refers to "the average level of educational attainment" (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) or similarly to "the average total years of schooling" (Savvides and Stengos, 2009 ).
Specifically, education and schooling enable workers to absorb knowledge and acquire additional human capital once employed (Rosen, 1976; Stokey, 1991; Laing et al., 1995) .
Therefore, it can be stated that the higher the level of schooling or knowledge (k) and the larger the human capital accumulation (h), the higher the rate of economic growth.
To simplify matters, and without loss of generality, we assume h = k, so that education and human capital can be used interchangeably. Then, we specify a simple equation for the rate of productivity growth (γ ):
with the further property that Since the education level and skill of the workers employed in the regular sector are higher than those in the underground sector (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello and Zizza, 2009) , growth is expected to be faster in the regular sector. This link is assumed in the form of labour-augmenting technological progress à la Pissarides (2000) , where, specifically, workers' human capital plays two roles, as suggested by Laing et al. (1995) . In fact, since human capital is firstly acquired through formal education, workers can be employed with an initial productivity ( 0 y ) that depends on the level of schooling (h). Secondly, workers' productivity increases according to the rate of productivity growth. Let us then state the following assumption:
Assumption 3. According to this assumption, the underground sector partially benefits from this process because of spill-over effects in the diffusion of knowledge. Therefore, both sectors can grow at the same rate ( ) h γ , while the level of productivity in the regular sector remains higher than that of productivity in the underground sector. The static model of the previous section should also be re-specified so that the variables τ , , s r c c and z are indexed to the productivity levels.
In this way, the costs of posting vacancies, taxes and the opportunity cost of employment are commensurate with the changing production level of the economy.
In order to endogenise the rate of productivity growth, let us consider the optimal choice of education for individuals, given that schooling investment is costly (cf. Laing et al., 1995; Decreuse and Granier, 2007) , and that only regular firms profitably employ educated 10 Workers invest in education before entering the labour market in Laing et al. (1995) . Unlike Laing et al. (1995) and Decreuse and Granier (2007) , in this model the optimal choice of education is linked to the wage differential rather than to the value of searching for a job. Furthermore, following Dulleck et al. (2006) , we can assume that the costs of higher education in the shadow sector tend to infinity.
Hence, in order to search for a job (work) in the regular sector, more workers choose to invest in education. In turn, the higher the optimal investment in education, the greater the human capital and the greater the productivity level of the economy. Therefore, the increase in the size of the regular sector, i.e. r θ , spurs economic growth by a greater investment in education.
It follows that, from a macroeconomic point of view, the investment in education is on the one hand negatively linked to the size of the underground sector, and on the other, positively linked to the productivity growth of the economy. The following Proposition can thus be stated: The ambiguous relationship between growth and unemployment that has been found in theory is plausible from an empirical point of view. In fact, different authors obtain different results concerning the sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment, both across countries and across long periods of time in the same country (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Bean and Pissarides, 1993; Caballero, 1993; Hoon and Phelps, 1997; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001 ). This issue has been effectively synthesised by Mortensen (2005) , who shows that the correlation between average growth and average unemployment over the past ten years across 29 European countries is essentially zero.
However, Pissarides and Vallanti (2004, 2007) have found that, on the basis of a panel of advanced countries, productivity growth is strongly negatively correlated with unemployment in the long run. They thus conclude that technological progress seems to have mainly taken the form of 'disembodied technology'.
11
If less advanced countries are also considered in the study of the relationship between growth and unemployment, such as European transition countries and Latin American countries, interesting results emerge. In fact, simple cross-country econometric estimates
show results that are both consistent with those of Pissarides and Vallanti when the sample is restricted to advanced countries, and that support the conclusions of our model when the sample is extended.
Since the key variable of our model is the monitoring rate, we have to find a suitable variable which is negatively correlated with the underground economy but linked to the monitoring rate. A natural candidate is the 'rule of law' index, which captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The correlation coefficient between shadow (underground) economy and the 'rule of law' index is about -0.75. 12 This result does not change by using other proxies for the monitoring rate, such as the 'government effectiveness' index and/or 'the corruption perception' index, since the correlation coefficients among them are extremely high.
13
Econometric estimates show clear results (see Tables 3 and 4 and the dataset in Tables   1 and 2 ). In synthesis, the unemployment rate has been regressed by using the rates of economic growth for the whole sample. The estimate has been firstly controlled for three regional dummies, thus capturing institutional and cultural differences, i.e. is not rejected at any customary confidence level. Obviously, both 1 and 2 exhibit positive signs since the unemployment rate in the EU transition countries and Latin-American countries is higher than in the EU non-transition countries.
11 More precisely, the "capitalisation" effect seems to dominate, while the "creative destruction" effect seems to play no role in the steady-state unemployment dynamics, since at reasonable parameter values a nontrivial negative impact of growth on unemployment is incompatible with embodied technology. 12 The shadow (underground) economy is calculated as % of GDP (1996-2007 average) according to Schneider et al. (2010) . 13 Indeed, the correlation between "rule of law" and "government effectiveness" is higher than 0.90.
In the second estimate, the control for the 'rule of law' index is instead introduced.
The dummy variable D rule assumes value 1 if the index is high and zero otherwise. 
The case of multiple equilibria
The extended model may also be adapted in order to account for a special case: that of regional dualism, i.e. the failure of the more backward region to catch up with the more developed region.
Let us assume that
is a logistic function, i.e. it performs increasing returns to human capital before the usual and eventual decreasing returns. This form may be due to thresholds in human capital, i.e. once human capital attains a certain threshold level (critical mass) productivity may reach a higher steady-state level (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) . This pattern has also received some empirical evidence (Savvides and Stengos, 2009). 16 Under this assumption, the relationship between T and s v may change significantly.
Indeed, if the functions [17] and [19] are plugged into [7] , then multiple equilibria become possible since the T-curve may display an increasing part in the middle, thus crossing the other curve twice, as depicted in Fig. 2 (dotted line).
17
The two extreme equilibria may be labelled as "good" and "bad" because they define two different conditions where the proportion of the underground sector is small and, 14 Precisely, we use as threshold value an index of rule of law equal to 82. This value is calculated as the mean between the maximum and average values (by excluding, however, the too low value of Venezuela). 15 The results do not differ much if the 'rule of law' index is used as a continuous variable. Indeed, in this case, we have a lower adjusted-R-square. 16 The models which describe general nonlinearities in the relationship between growth and human capital do not provide specific functional forms (Savvides and Stengos, 2009 ). Azariadis and Drazen (1990) even study a step functional form, where thresholds are more than one. 17 As shown by Savvides and Stengos (2009) -adapted from Azariadis and Drazen (1990) -a step functional form may generate the possibility of multiple equilibria, with different balanced growth paths. This growth process comes to an end when "labour productivity attains the highest possible value and the system settles down on the ultimate stage of growth" (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, p. 517). respectively, large, with the consequent desirable and undesirable characterisations.
Specifically, in the "good" equilibrium one region exhibits higher productivity, a more efficient use of entrepreneurial ability, higher investment in education, greater employment of skilled workers, and, finally, a higher rate of economic growth with respect to the region in the "bad" equilibrium.
This result is interesting because it can represent an economy characterised by a uniform institutional set-up, as captured by the parameters of the model, but with two regions that differ in their histories, as captured by the different relative sizes of the underground sector. The region that has inherited from the past a sufficiently greater proportion of the underground sector will tend to the "bad" equilibrium, at least in the case of scarce mobility of labour. The region that has inherited a smaller proportion of the underground sector will tend to the "good" equilibrium. The economy will thus exhibit regional dualism, which may persist even in the long run, because the region in the "bad" equilibrium also performs a relatively lower steady-growth. This case seems to be the best fit with the Italian North-South divide, which is distinctive but not unique in the world.
Conclusions
The persistence of the underground sector, albeit different extents, in all countries around the world has been documented by many studies, and has been called the 'shadow puzzle'. How the underground sector relates with unemployment has also been studied, without clarifying, however, whether the relationship is positive or negative. Research on the underground sector encounters a third issue which is related to economic growth, i.e. whether the relationship between unemployment and economic growth is negative or positive. At microeconomic level, several studies have found that underground firms employ relatively backward technology, less educated, less skilled, and less paid workers, as well as less able entrepreneurs, i.e. lower quality inputs for growth. This microeconomic evidence has suggested useful links for building a matching-type model of endogenous growth that is able to account for both the 'shadow puzzle' and the two ambiguous relationships.
The key assumption of the model, which is also rather new in matching models, is that entrepreneurial ability is a heterogeneous input for production. If also workers are not homogeneous because they can become educated and skilled, then two types of firms emerge:
the more productive firms where the ablest entrepreneurs match with skilled workers, and the less productive firms where the less able entrepreneurs match with unskilled workers. These latter firms form the underground sector, because they can persistently survive on the market by evading taxes and paying lower wages. Their role in the economic growth is negative, because they discourage human capital accumulation and hence productivity growth.
The model predicts that monitoring firms' regularity determines whether or not unemployment is complementary to underground employment, and, consequently, whether unemployment is positively or negatively related with economic growth. Some econometric evidence supports this role of law enforcement in making the relationship between unemployment and economic growth positive or negative.
The model used is rather general (and the growth equation rather simple), so that it can be applied to a number of cases. In the paper, the case is made for EU non-transition and Latin American countries, which exhibit a high share of underground sector. Another interesting case is regional dualism, e.g. the North-South dualism in Italy, where some backward regions diverge from the others, although both groups share the same institutional set-up. For this case the model has been made more specific by assuming sufficient nonlinearities in the human capital accumulation function, so that multiple equilibria emerge in the size of the underground sector.
A number of policy implications ensue from this analysis. Reducing the tax burden becomes especially effective if monitoring is at a high level, because underground firms are discouraged without raising unemployment. In the long run, this may also enhance growth.
These same results follow if monitoring is itself increased. In the case of regional dualism, a one-shot change in the policy parameters may trigger an endogenous dynamic of convergence between the two regions. More generally, an effective policy should seek to increase entrepreneurial ability, typically through education, so that overall economic performance improves, both because of the sectoral composition effect, and because of the positive level effect of each firm. were Cobb-Douglas. Similar reasoning can be applied again to D, which would be equal to ∞ at the limit of the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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